Methodological determinism and the free will hypothesis.

Kirsch, Irving and Hyland, Michael E. (2017) Methodological determinism and the free will hypothesis. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4 (3). pp. 321-323. ISSN 2326-5523

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000135

Abstract

In this comment on the article by Papanicolaou, we introduce the concept of methodological determinism and discuss the scientific status of the concept of free will. We argue that determinism is an implicit heuristic assumption of modern science, dating back to Newton’s optics. Papanicolaou acknowledges that instances of free will being an illusion have been corroborated. We add that the proposition of free will determining behavior is unfalsifiable. It is, therefore, a metaphysical proposition and not a scientific hypothesis.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Article is also available through the publisher link provided
Depositing User:	Ms Kerry Kellaway
Date Deposited:	01 Aug 2019 11:10
Last Modified:	01 Aug 2019 11:10
URI:	https://marjon.repository.guildhe.ac.uk/id/eprint/17434
Related URLs:	https://psycnet ... 39242-001?doi=1 (Publisher URL)

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